Nature is not natural and can never be naturalized — Graham Harman

Tuesday, April 12, 2011

Questions from De Paul 3

Now it's James Manos's turn:

During the q and a I asked two questions, which I think were related, and perhaps on this point of the ego of the object. How these things resonant together is a little hazy to me, but I will try to reconstruct it as best I can.

In thinking about the melancholic characteristic of "Dark Ecology," you spoke about, if I can translate your language, the introjection of the object--that is to say the way in which the object impresses itself not only on ourselves but also other objects. If we were to take this idea literally and little further through Freud, then perhaps we could speak about the "ego" of the object—although there would be some serious limitations to this.

Nonetheless, in the chapter on the super-ego in The Ego and the Id Freud suggests that perhaps the ego is nothing more than "abandoned object cathexes." I do not have the text with me now but you will find it half way through the second or third paragraph of that section. If objects, like subjects, are impressed upon by objects; and if subjects form their ego through the continual introjection of objects, then could we tentatively and problematically speak of the melancholic ego of objects (the historical record of the objects relationship to the other objects that have impressed themselves on the object).

The other question, and this is related to the first, was what is the difference between concepts and hyper-objects?

My response:

I think by “concept” James meant sensual object, in my terminology. It's possible I was confused and confusing between sensual and real objects, it's a part of the thinking about it that I haven't completely worked out. So I'm not sure how to answer completely on the difference between concepts and hyperobjects. But even if global warming is sensual, it is also sensual for voles and linen. Surely there is a real aspect and a sensual aspect.

Replicating molecules themselves might suffer some kind of disequilibrium, try to return to quiescent state, reproduce, ironically; death as being overwhelmed by externality

Death drive all the way down to DNA: molecule in a state of disequilibrium, wants to cancel itself out.

My essay on Freud for Nicola Masciandaro and Eugene Thacker talks about this somewhat.

So I like very much this idea of a theory of melancholia that's object-oriented, since melancholia itself is an object-like entity. This implies that objects themselves have egos, yes for sure, and that these egos do not fully account for the being of the object. Excellent idea.
You can see why this Q&A got me going can't you?

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