2. (1) is not a decisional procedure.
1. Derrida is typically Jewish.
2. “Derrida is typically Jewish” is not a decisional procedure.
1. I, Laruelle, exempt myself from my critique of everyone else.
2. (1) is not a decisional procedure.
Monday, February 24, 2014
Laruellgorithm
1. All philosophers are hamstrung by decisional procedures.
2. (1) is not a decisional procedure.
Example:
1. Derrida is typically Jewish.
2. “Derrida is typically Jewish” is not a decisional procedure.
Or:
1. I, Laruelle, exempt myself from my critique of everyone else.
2. (1) is not a decisional procedure.
2. (1) is not a decisional procedure.
1. Derrida is typically Jewish.
2. “Derrida is typically Jewish” is not a decisional procedure.
1. I, Laruelle, exempt myself from my critique of everyone else.
2. (1) is not a decisional procedure.
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3 comments:
What is up with Laurelle's use of the term "Jewish philosophy". I've read the first couple of chapters and it baffles me how it comes up and what he means by it. Is this some widely adopted distinction he's using that's falsely triggering my anti-semitism radar or am I right to feel a little creeped out by it?
What is up with Laurelle's use of the term "Jewish philosophy". I've read the first couple of chapters and it baffles me how it comes up and what he means by it. Is this some widely adopted distinction he's using or am I right to feel a little creeped out by it?
What is up with Laurelle's use of the term "Jewish philosophy". I've read the first couple of chapters and it baffles me how it comes up and what he means by it. Is this some widely adopted distinction he's using or am I right to feel a little creeped out by it?
(apologies if this comment shows up multiple times. Google's comment system is being a bit baffling and I can't tell if it's gone through.)
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