The earlier presentation on Guerilla Metaphyics mentioned Harman's idea that objects experience a relationship to their parts that is similar to their relationship with other objects. Could you comment on how the distinction between an object and its parts--this radical alterity--can allow for any the existence of the object at all, since it's sort of its own other. Does this have to do with the self-differing we discussed in an earlier class--the object's always being slightly ahead of itself?
The earlier presentation on Guerilla Metaphyics mentioned Harman's idea that objects experience a relationship to their parts that is similar to their relationship with other objects. Could you comment on how the distinction between an object and its parts--this radical alterity--can allow for any the existence of the object at all, since it's sort of its own other. Does this have to do with the self-differing we discussed in an earlier class--the object's always being slightly ahead of itself?
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