“Was not their mistake once more bred of the life of slavery that they had been living?—a life which was always looking upon everything, except mankind, animate and inanimate—‘nature,’ as people used to call it—as one thing, and mankind as another, it was natural to people thinking in this way, that they should try to make ‘nature’ their slave, since they thought ‘nature’ was something outside them” — William Morris


Wednesday, June 8, 2011

As-Structures and the Sorites


Henry Warwick points out that when I put a cup on this thingamajig here, it's a table. Yes indeed. This is one way we vanquish the Sorites paradox.

The deep problem, however, has to do with the existence of this thingamajig despite me. Sure, it's as-structured as a table.

The two issues might meet at some point. For instance, suppose I have a wafer thin table after removing n chips. I put a cup on it and it falls right through. I think it's a table but it no longer functions as one. Or I'm camping. I use a handy tree stump as a table, knobby as it is and wobbly as it makes my cup.

The thingamajig in each case is quite unique, quite different. The tree stump smells of sap and has insects crawling around it. The badly glued piece of furniture in my kitchen, which I've been abusing with this Stanley knife, smells of baby food and is highly polished on one side.

How come I can as-structure either of them (in my perception, my language or my usage) as a table? The OOO answer is that they are non-tables. What they are withdraws from access even as I rest my cup on them and say “Hey, nice table.”

2 comments:

John Muse said...

You write, "How come I can as-structure either of them (in my perception, my language or my usage) as a table? The OOO answer is that they are non-tables. What they are withdraws from access even as I rest my cup on them and say 'Hey, nice table.'"

I'm confused. I expect you to say that what they are (an emergent property of parts that, like the proverbial heap, can't be determined in the abstract) and what they can do (real effects) are related, but that the latter doesn't exhaust the former.

Names like "table" pick out the doing and miss the being, and these and other linguistic practices form new objects more or less durable. Can we then consider the language games as heaps too, made as they are of things, words, activities? I know Wittgenstein isn't typically considered on the OOO side of the fence, but your discussion of Sorites and heaps makes me think of him.

Have I botched your meaning here?

Timothy Morton said...

Thank you John for this--it's very helpful, I shall chew it...